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construct. Interestingly, they propose that this "mismatch" between nodes in the model and available statistical parameters occurs due to the false positive evidence typically not being given a causal status. In other words, people can connect cancer to positive mammographies in direct causal terms, but cannot represent false positive data about mammographies in equivalent terms. Without a means of including this evidence in one's initial causal model, there is subsequently a "mismatch" between the nodes in the model and the statistical parameters, leaving people unsure of how to integrate the statistical data. Krynski and Tenenbaum assert that reasoners instead tend to focus on P E H and P E H , in many cases simply subtracting the latter from the former, leading to highly over-inflated estimates of the probability of cancer.
To test their account, Krynski and Tenenbaum compared performance on standard and causal versions of the mammography problem. In the causal version participants were told that false positive mammographies are caused by benign cysts. The argument now was that people could intuitively construct a causal model which connected both cancer, and cysts, to positive mammographies. The given statistical data now directly mapped to the parameters of the nodes in this model, in turn allowing participants to calculate the ratio of the probability of a positive test given that a woman has cancer to the overall probability of a positive result. Krynski and Tenenbaum carried out two experiments using these materials. In Experiment 1, only base rates for each cause were presented, and participants were told that most women who had either a benign cyst or breast cancer received a positive mammogram.
In Experiment 2, participants were told that, of the 1% of women with cancer, 80% received a positive mammogram (P E H = .8). In the causal condition participants were told that 30% of women had benign cysts and that 50% of those women tested positive, and in the standard condition that 15% of women without breast cancer tested positive. Thus, in both cases, the probability of a positive result in the absence of cancer P H x P E H was set at .15.
Causal structure and statistical reasoning 8 The results of these experiments are striking: in Experiment 1 where the problem was simpler, about 25% of participants who received the standard problem gave the Bayesian response whereas roughly 45% of participants who read the Causal version did. In their Experiment 2 where the problem was more complex, rates of Bayesian responding in the standard condition fell to roughly 15% whereas they remained at roughly 45% in the Causal condition. In both experiments Base rate neglect almost vanished in the Causal condition (< 10%) whereas about 30% of responses in the standard condition suggested that the base rates had been neglected.
Krynski and Tenenbaum's results support the adequacy of their normative account as a description of human statistical reasoning, and suggest novel ways in which good statistical reasoning might be facilitated, namely that the overall probability of the evidence should be calculated across all candidate causes of that evidence. Under their account, Equation 2 specifies how to arrive at a normatively correct estimate for problems such as the mammography problem. In this equation C refers to the focal cause (i.e. breast cancer) and alt C refers to the alternative cause.
P C x P E C P C x P E C P alt C x P E alt C Equation
Although Krynski and Tenenbaum (2007) designed their reasoning materials so that application of the statistical Bayesian norm and their alternative causal Bayesian norm gave the same answer, in many cases this will not be true. This is because the causal Bayesian account does not require a base rate for the complementary hypothesis (e.g. that a woman does not have breast cancer) but for an alternative cause (e.g. that a woman has a benign cyst). Because the base rate for the complementary hypothesis in their example is almost 1, application of the statistical Bayesian norm calls for the probability of a positive test and a benign cyst to be weighted by a probability close to one. However, if the base rate for cancer had been set at .2, then the probability of the complementary hypothesis would have been .8, and application of the statistical Bayesian norm would have required the probability of a positive test and a benign cyst to be weighted by .8. As the causal Bayesian framework does not require the P alt C x P E alt C term to be weighted by the base rate for the complementary hypothesis, the normative frameworks predict different answers in this case.
So although Krynski and Tenenbaum (2007) cleverly designed their materials to that both normative frameworks would give the same answer, this is only possible when the base rate for the focal hypothesis is very low.
A consequence of the difference between the statistical and causal normative
Bayesian accounts is that the statistics required to compute each answer may be different. In fact, the materials used in Krynski and Tenenbaum's second experiment confound provision of information about an alternative cause with the particular statistical information that is described. So, participants in the causal conditions were provided with four statistics, including the base rate for the alternative cause, whereas participants in the standard condition were provided with three statistics and left to infer the base rate for the complementary hypothesis (P(¬H)). This observation is not meant as criticism; in order to provide participants with the percentage statistics required to calculate the causal Bayesian answer, Krynski and Tenenbaum had to provide them with information about the alternative cause rather than about the logically defined complementary hypothesis. One way to avoid a confound in the statistics that are presented would be to present participants in the causal condition with summary information about false positives. That is, rather than presenting participants with separate base rates and likelihoods for the alternative cause, they learn the percentage of participants who possess the alternative cause and a positive mammogram. As this statistic is identical to the false positive rate provided to participants in the standard problem, providing it to both sets of participants allows us to manipulate the provision of causal information whilst controlling for the particular statistics that are presented in each condition. We adopted this strategy in all three of the experiments to be described here.
Prior to Krynski & Tenenbaum's demonstrations, the role of causal information in base rate neglect had already been investigated. However, Krynski & Tenenbaum's claims differ from and go beyond that previous work. For example, Bar-Hillel (1980) showed that information about the likelihood of the evidence given the hypotheses appeared more causally relevant than the base rates and that simultaneously decreasing the causal relevance of the likelihoods and increasing the causal relevance of the base rates reduced base rate neglect (see also Ajzen, 1977) . However, that earlier work was carried out in a strictly statistical Bayesian framework and treated causality as affecting the perceived relevance of statistical information. In line with other recent work carried out against the background of Pearl's (2000) ideas about causal models (for a review see Sloman, 2005) , Krynski & Tenenbaum suggest that the success of participants' Bayesian judgments is contingent upon being able to intuitively represent the given evidence in causal terms; statistical problems which support this approach should yield higher levels of Bayesian responding.
Our initial rationale
To the best of our knowledge, Krynski and Tenenbaum's experiments are the only ones demonstrating causal facilitation effects (but see Hayes, Newell & Hawkins, 2013) .
Because of the potential theoretical and practical importance of those findings, our first aim was to extend and generalise them beyond the limited range of reasoning problems which were employed in the original experiments. Krynski and Tenenbaum (2007) propose that the causal Bayesian framework represents a more descriptive account of peoples' statistical reasoning than the traditional Bayesian norm; if this is the case then causal facilitation effects should be observed on novel problems which permit intuitive causal models to be easily parameterised with the appropriate data in Bayesian terms. Our second aim was to investigate, through the use of a secondary load manipulation, the extent to which the causal facilitation effect is intuitive in nature. Although Krynski and Ajzen, 1977; Tversky & Kahneman, 1980) have suggested that the effects of causal knowledge on statistical judgement are mediated via a causal heuristic, and this possibility is not disputed by Krynski and Tenenbaum (2007, see pg. 447) . If the role of causal knowledge in statistical reasoning is intuitive or heuristic, then putting reasoners under load should not interfere with the size of the causal facilitation effect, that is, participants should be able to represent the evidence in clear causal terms, irrespective of load.
Experiment 1 Method
Participants: There were 64 participants (19 male), aged between 18 and 40 years.
Participants received no payment and were recruited around Queen's University Belfast through word of mouth and online advertising. (Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995; Cosmides & Tooby, 1996) , mainly because it permits a simpler Bayesian calculation on the basis of fewer statistical parameters (3 as opposed to 4).
Our Causal mammography problem can be found below. Before each reasoning problem, participants were shown a 3 x 3 grid containing a pattern of dots (see also Franssens and De Neys, 2009; Verschueren, Schaeken & d'Ydewalle, 2004) . In the complex condition (see Figure 1a ) the patterns contained four dots in randomly determined grid positions. In the low load condition (see Figure 1b ) these patterns were simple continuous lines of three dots. Each grid was displayed for 1000ms, giving participants enough time to perceive the pattern clearly. Their task was to keep the displayed pattern in memory whilst calculating an answer to the reasoning problem. After Causal structure and statistical reasoning 14 submitting an answer to the reasoning problem participants then had to recall the dot pattern, from memory, on a blank 3 x 3 grid, and received feedback as to their recall performance.
Problem order of presentation was randomised for each participant. However, Load was blocked so that half of the participants attempted four low load trials first and the other half received the high load trials first. Procedure: The experiment took place in a small computer lab in QUB, where participants were tested individually or in groups of up to six. Participants were told that there was no time limit for completion of the experiment, and that use of calculators or pens was prohibited. Most participants completed the experiment within 25 minutes. All parts of the experiment were presented in E-Prime.
Results
Data Coding: To allow for calculation errors, responses within 5% of the correct Bayesian answer were coded as Bayesian, whilst those within 5% of the statistical Bayesian account estimate produced using only the likelihoods were coded as base rate neglect. Responses within 5% of the estimate produced by using the focal base rate only were labelled as likelihood neglect. We coded a likelihood neglect category because previous work has shown that people sometimes overweight the base rates instead of neglecting them (see Evans, Handley, Over & Perham, 2002) . All remaining responses were labelled as other. The problems we used in the experiment were constructed so that these response categories never overlapped. Note also that our system for coding responses is different from that used by Krynski and Tenenbaum (2007) who categorised only exactly correct answers as Bayesian, and answers greater than P E H P E H as base rate neglect. They coded all other answers as other.
Secondary Task To explore the marginally significant interaction we performed a median split on overall performance on the secondary task and found an effect of load on Bayesian responding in participants who performed well on the secondary task, t(28) = 2.77, p < .01, Cohens d = .51, but no effect of load in participants who performed less well on the secondary task, t(34) = Data on individual differences in responding are to be found in Table 1 , where it may be seen that almost all participants gave mixed responses. Only one participant gave the Bayesian response on every trial and only eight gave a majority of Bayesian responses.
( Table 1 here)
Discussion
Experiment 1 failed to produce any evidence that providing information about an alternative cause for false positives improves reasoning. At best, participants were significantly less likely to commit base rate neglect when information about an alternative cause had been provided. We found some evidence that imposition of a secondary load affected participants'
responding. In particular, amongst participants who did well on the secondary task there were significantly fewer Bayesian responses under heavy load. This suggests that our failure to find an overall effect of load may have occurred because a substantial number of participants prioritised the primary over the secondary task.
Without finding a causal facilitation effect, it is difficult to comment on how exactly heavy load interfered with reasoning. Although there appear to be individual differences in the degree to which participants engaged with the secondary task, it is also possible that the relatively weak effects of our Problem Type manipulation may have been due to the imposition of a secondary load. For example, it is possible that even a light load resulted in substantial decrements in performance on the primary task. Because the results of this experiment were unexpected, we ran a second experiment in which we manipulated problem type and load entirely within participants. Forty participants completed 16 reasoning problems, four in each cell of the design. Load size was blocked and block order was counterbalanced. We found no effects of either variable in this experiment and when collapsed across load conditions, rates of correct responding to the Causal (25%) and Standard (22%) problems were very similar to those observed in Experiment 1. In the light of this second failure to find either a causal facilitation effect or a clear effect of load, we adopted new aims for the remaining experiments.
Experiment 2
Although the initial rationale for our experiments was to extend evidence for a causal facilitation effect in statistical reasoning, and to examine whether the construction and parameterisation of causal models is effortful or effortless, the results of Experiment 1 and the follow-up experiment we have informally described, caused us to focus in our subsequent experiments on establishing whether, and under what circumstances, a causal facilitation effect could be produced with our materials. Our materials were subtly different to those used by Krynski & Tenenbaum, and it is possible that this subtle difference is obscuring the effects of providing information about an alternative cause. Alternatively, it may be that the load manipulation has interfered with our ability to detect the effect. In this experiment we abandoned the load manipulation, but continued to use our versions of the problems where participants learned either P(E ¬H) in the control condition, or P(E alt C) in the causal condition.
In addition to abandoning the load manipulation, in Experiment 2 we manipulated the nature of the response required from participants. In order to reduce the processing load required to give a correct response, we asked half of the participants in Experiment 2 to choose the correct response from an array of four. We expected this change to response requirements to produce an overall improvement in reasoning. Of greater interest was whether it would produce greater improvement with Causal problems than with Standard problems. Tenenbaum's coding scheme, only exactly correct answers were placed in the Bayesian category, whereas answers greater than P E H P E H were assigned to the base rate neglect category (see also Macchi, 1995 Macchi, , 2000 . Because, for some of the problems in Experiment 1, the Bayesian probability estimate was higher than P E H P E H , we were unable to compare results obtained using the two coding systems. In the problems selected for Experiment 2, the Bayesian estimate was always lower than P E H P E H , so we will be able to consider the effects of coding strategy on our results. Participants in the Multiple Choice condition were given a selection of four potential answers presented as percentages. Each of the four answers reflected one of the four categories of response for which we coded in Experiment 1. "Other" responses in this case were random numbers that were separated from each of the other answers by at least 10%.
Procedure: Participants were approached and asked whether they would participate. They were then given a page which contained the four reasoning problems. Participants were asked not to use calculators, and were advised not to take longer than ten minutes to complete the problems.
Results
So as to be able to compare the effects of coding scheme on our results, we coded responses using both the four-category system and Krynski & Tenenbaum's three-category scheme.
Four-category coding: Responses were initially coded in the same way as for Experiment 1.
Examination of Appendix 2 reveals that participants' responses were similar across reasoning problems. Figure 3 None of the other effects tested by these analyses were significant nor were any of the effects tested by analyses of rates of likelihood neglect and other responses. Analyses of individual differences in consistency of responding (see Table 1 ) showed that all but two participants gave mixed responses across the four problems in this experiment.
Three-category coding: Free responses were recoded using Krynski and Tenenbaum's (2007) three-category coding scheme. Only the exact answer was coded as a Bayesian response, any response greater than P E H P E H was coded as a base rate neglect response, whilst any remaining responses were coded as other. 
Discussion
The results of Experiment 2 show a causal facilitation effect: participants who received problems describing an alternative cause were more likely to approximate the Bayesian response and less likely to neglect the base rate than were participants who did not receive information about an alternative cause. Although we found an effect of whether participants produced or chose a response, the size of the causal facilitation effect was the same in both response formats. These results show that even when participants are presented just with information about an alternative cause for the false positive rate rather than with information about the base rate and likelihood for the alternative cause (as was the case in Krynski and
Tenenbaum's study), a causal facilitation effect may be observed.
It is important to note that, for participants asked to produce responses, the rate of Bayesian responding in the Causal condition (24%) was very similar to that observed in Experiment 1. On the other hand, the rate of Bayesian responding in the Standard condition (11%) was considerably lower than we observed in Experiment 1. We will return to this finding in the General Discussion.
A causal facilitation effect was not observed when responses were coded using
Krynski & Tenenbaum's three-category scheme. This is because a near-negligible number of responses were assigned to the Bayesian category when only the exact answer was coded as Bayesian (4% on Causal problems and 2% on Standard problems). Whilst this may be a result of requiring people to make more difficult calculations than Krynski and Tenenbaum, a clear disadvantage of the three-category scheme here is that it does not make allowances for calculation errors. However, results obtained using the four-category scheme, which allows for approximation, strongly suggest that Causal problems produce more approximately Bayesian responses. It is striking that even when allowances are made for approximation, rates of Bayesian responding on causal versions of our problems are much lower than were observed by Krynski and Tenenbaum (2007) . Experiment 3 was designed investigate one possible cause of this difference between our results and theirs.
Experiment 3
The experiments described thus far have used materials in which the statistical information presented in the Standard and Causal problems has been identical: the base rate for breast cancer, the frequency of positive tests given breast cancer and the frequency of positive tests given a benign cyst/the absence of breast cancer. Krynski and Tenenbaum, on the other hand, presented different statistics in the two conditions. In the Standard condition, participants learned the base rate for breast cancer, and the likelihoods for a positive mammography given the focal and complementary hypotheses. In the causal condition they learned the base rate for cancer, the base rate for the alternative cause, and the likelihood of a positive test given each of these causes. Although the problems were designed so that they produced the same answer, Krynski and Tenenbaum argued that the differences between the two forms of the reasoning problem would lead to different causal models parameterised in different ways. It is possible that the relatively low rate of Bayesian responding we have observed may be due to the difference between the statistics presented to participants in our Causal problems and those presented by Krynski and Tenenbaum. Accordingly, in Experiment 3 we attempted to directly replicate Krynski and Tenenbaum's Experiment 2. In addition, we included a second causal condition, where participants were presented with causal materials similar to those we have used in Experiments 1 and 2. In these materials participants learned P(E alt C).
Although all statistics in this experiment were presented in the form of percentages, the problems in this last condition are structurally identical to the Causal problems in our earlier
experiments. Comparison of this three parameter causal condition to Krynski and
Tenenbaum's four parameter causal condition will allow us to draw conclusions about whether the precise way that the underlying causal model is parameterised is important to the rate of Bayesian reasoning that is observed.
To allow for a complete replication of Krynski and Tenenbaum's Experiment 2, participants in this experiment initially attempted one of the mammography problems from that experiment. Responses on these problems were analysed separately. Next participants in each of the three conditions solved a further three problems. The predictions for this experiment are straightforward: if the precise statistics are important to the causal facilitation effect, then we should observe more Bayesian responding in the four parameter causal condition than in the three parameter causal condition, and a bigger facilitation effect in the former case. On the other hand, if merely providing a causal basis for false positives underlies the effect, then we should find no difference between the two causal conditions and an approximately equal facilitation effect caused by both.
Method
Participants: 126 participants (57 male, 69 female) aged between 18 and 33 years old were recruited. Participants were approached at a number of locations on the university campus.
Design: The experiment had one between subjects independent variable, Problem Type, manipulated at three levels: four parameter Causal vs. three parameter Causal vs. Standard.
As in Experiment 2, problems were presented in a booklet, and participants gave written percentage probability estimates. Because Krynski and Tenenbaum set the focal base in the mammography problem at 1%, the statistical and causal Bayesian answers to that problem were the same. In the remaining problems, we varied the base rate which meant that the statistical and causal
Bayesian answers were different. However, the difference between the answers was never more than 6%.
Results
Data Coding: For all of the analyses reported here, we used the causal Bayesian equation (Equation 2) to determine the correct answer on three parameter and four parameter causal problems. We used the standard Bayesian equation (Equation 1) to determine the correct answer on standard problems. For all problem types, estimates greater than P E H P E H were coded as base rate neglect, and all other responses were coded as Other. To Table 2 shows how participants varied in the numbers of each type of response given across each Problem Type.
( Table 2 here)
Discussion
Although we failed to replicate Krynski and Tenenbaum's effect using their materials, nonetheless Experiment 3 has provided more evidence that information about the causal basis of the false positive statistic facilitates Bayesian reasoning. In addition, although the rates of Bayesian responding observed in this experiment are quite similar to those observed in our earlier experiments, there was no evidence that the precise statistics provided to participants about the alternative cause increased the number of Bayesian responses. Participants were almost as likely to give a Bayesian response when told P(E alt C) as when told P(alt C) and P E alt C . It appears then, that the causal facilitation effect is due to provision of additional causal information rather than to the particular statistics that accompany that causal information.
General Discussion
The experiments in this paper were designed to further explore whether errors on typical statistical reasoning problems, such as the mammography problem, can be reduced by explicitly detailing a cause for false positive outcomes. We found that provision of additional causal information improved Bayesian responding in Experiments 2 and 3 and reduced the rate of base rate neglect in Experiments 1 and 2. These results suggest that the causal facilitation effect is real, but because the rate of Bayesian responding in our causal conditions never exceeded 25%, they also suggest that the effect of providing additional causal information may not be as universally powerful as was first assumed. The results of Experiment 3 show that the reduction in the rate of Bayesian responding in our causal conditions cannot be attributed to differences between our experiments and Krynski and
Tenenbaum's in the nature of the statistical information that was provided. It appears that merely providing people with the cause for false positives allows some of them to integrate the statistics in the problem. One similarity between our results and Krynski and
Tenenbaum's is the remarkable consistency in rates of Bayesian responding on causal problems found in each study. Despite changes to experimental design, procedures, and materials, roughly one in four of all responses to causal Bayesian problems in our experiments were approximately Bayesian. In both of their mammography experiments, 45%
of all responses were exactly Bayesian.
One interpretation of the consistency within each set of experiments is that providing information about an alternative cause facilitates the intuitive construction and parameterisation of a causal model. That is, regardless of the number of statistics, the response format, or the number of problems attempted, when some participants read additional causal information they spontaneously include it in a qualitative causal model of the problem. Experiment 1 attempted to investigate this more directly through use of a dual task procedure found by Franssens and De Neys (2009) to increase base rate neglect errors as a result of intuitive thinking. It is noteworthy that even amongst those participants who were affected by a secondary load in Experiment 1, size of load did not interact with whether the problem was Causal or Standard in determining response type. This finding, together with the consistency in correct responding between load and non-load experiments, could be taken to suggest that the facilitating effect of additional causal information operates at a level that is not subject to factors such as working memory limitations, and is intuitive in nature.
Despite both our study and Krynski and Tenenbaum's indicating consistency in correct responding on causal statistical problems, important contrasts exist between our findings and theirs. In particular, we found less correct responding on causal problems (around 20% -25%) than they did (around 45%). This at least partly accounts for the failure to find a causal facilitation effect in Experiment 1, as rates of correct responding on Standard problems were also over 20%, but fell sufficiently in latter experiments such that a significant difference existed between problem types. One possible explanation for the diminished rates of Bayesian responding that we observed on causal problems is that we sampled participants from a population with lower underlying ability than did Krynski and Tenenbaum (2007) . Brase, Fiddick, and Harries (2006) have shown that undergraduate students from top-tier universities give more Bayesian responses than students from mid-tier universities, whilst still other work has indicated that differences in the ability of successive samples drawn from the same student population may also underlie differences in reasoning performance (Newstead, Handley, Harley, Wright, & Farrelly, 2004) . More recently, it has been shown that the facilitating effects of presenting statistical information as natural frequencies are either limited to, or much more prevalent in participants with better numerical skills (e.g. & Liu, 2009; Galesic, Gigerenzer & Straubinger, 2009; Sirota & Jaunchich, 2011) .
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All of this evidence, when considered alongside the differences between our results and
Krynski and Tenenbaum's, suggests that a study of individual or population differences in susceptibility to causal facilitation effects would be worthwhile.
Krynski and Tenenbaum's original experiments were motivated by the view that people compute Bayesian statistics over causal models. This is a different normative model to the classical Bayesian model and calls for reasoners to consider the probability of alternative causes rather than the probability of a complementary hypothesis. The problems that they used confounded the provision of information about an alternative cause with provision of the statistics required to parameterise a causal model representing that alternative cause. That is, the problems that they used led to different models parameterised in different ways. One advantage of the materials that we have used here is that in both conditions, the correct solution was arrived at in the same way. In three experiments we found that alerting people to the causal basis for false positives either reduced particular types of error or significantly increased Bayesian responding. Experiment 3 showed no difference in the size of the causal facilitation effect based on whether participants attempted Krynski and Tenenbaum's materials or ours. This may be interpreted as evidence for the claim that the causal facilitation effect is due to the presence of additional causal information cueing some participants to integrate information about the focal and alternative causes in the scenario. The effect does not seem to be dependent on the particular statistics that are presented in the causal scenario.
In conclusion, the current research has supported Krynski and Tenenbaum's contention that expecting reasoners to conduct Bayesian inference purely on the basis of statistical data is at odds with how people intuitively think about statistical reasoning problems. Instead, Bayesian judgements appear to be facilitated whenever the given evidence provides a causal basis for false positive information, suggesting that being able to represent all of the evidence in a coherent causal representation is a key initial step in how people think about integrating probabilistic information. Compared to typical statistical word problems with poorly defined false positive data, causal problem materials produced significantly more accurate Bayesian judgements. The exact nature of how this information is expressed -be it as a single figure with a defined cause, or as a base rate and conditional probability -appears not to affect judgement accuracy. What is clear, then, is that participants' understanding of the false positive information has an importance influence on how they think about integrating the probabilistic data. That performance on causal problems in the current work was immune to variations in design and procedure perhaps supports the idea that reasoners intuitively represent causal structure when thinking about statistical judgements. Such a conclusion is consistent with other results which suggest that causal information affects statistical reasoning at an intuitive level (see Crisp & Feeney, 2009 ).
However, the improvements in reasoning which come with clarifying the causal basis of the evidence may not be as large in every population as originally reported by Krynski and Tenenbaum (2007) . Overall, the current work adds to the picture that is emerging in which causal relations play a central role in cognition (for reviews see Sloman, 2005; Gopnik, 2012; Waldmann & Hagmayer, in press ). Future work might explore why additional causal information facilitates intuitively constructed representations in some people but not in others.
Appendices
Appendix 1: Reasoning Problems
The italicised text in each problem gives the wording for the presentation of false positive information in the Causal version.
Mammography Problem
Suppose the following statistics are known about women at age 60 who participate in a routine mammogram screening, an X-ray of the breast tissue that detects tumors: What % of predicted tornadoes would you expect to occur?
Counterfeit Money Problem
Suppose the following statistics are known about the banknotes currently in circulation.
15 in every 100 notes are counterfeit. Many retailers use special marker pens to test whether a note is counterfeit. These markers are successful in identifying 12 out of every 15 fake notes.
However, 25 out of every 85 legal notes are incorrectly identified as counterfeit. However, the ink in the marker sometimes reacts with chemicals often found on legal notes, resulting in 25 out of every 85 legal notes being incorrectly identified as counterfeit.
Of those notes identified by marker pens as being counterfeit, what % would you expect to be counterfeit?
Suspect Problem
Suppose the following statistics are known about airport security:
It is estimated that 4 in every 100 people who pass through Heathrow airport are wanted by the police. Using CCTV images, facial recognition software will correctly identify 3 out of every 4 police targets. However, 12 out of every 96 ordinary travellers are identified as suspects. However, glare from the sun means that the software incorrectly identifies 12 out of every 96 ordinary travellers as suspects.
Of those identified as suspects by the software, what % would you expect to be wanted by the police?
Speed Camera Problem
Suppose the following statistics are true statistics about speed limit enforcement:
30 in every 100 drivers break the speed limit along a certain stretch of motorway. Speed cameras detect 20 out of every 30 offenders. 7 out of every 70 cars driving below the speed limit are mistakenly detected as speeding, however. However, rain on the camera lens can distort the image a camera sees, so 7 out of every 70 cars driving below the speed limit are mistakenly detected as speeding.
What % of motorists identified as breaking the limit would you expect to have been speeding?
Sniffer Dog Problem
Suppose that the Department of Customs and Excise know the following statistics to be true:
10 out of every 100 pieces of luggage at Belfast City Airport contain drugs. Sniffer dogs correctly detect drugs in 9 out of every 10 cases where drugs are present. However, the presence of drugs is incorrectly detected in 2 out of every 90 cases. However, certain foodstuffs smell like drugs, and for this reason sniffer dogs will incorrectly detect the presence of drugs in 2 out of every 90 cases.
What % of luggage identified by sniffer dogs as containing drugs will actually contain drugs?
Pregnancy Test Problem
Suppose the following statistics about pregnancy true: What % of blocked e-mails are spam e-mails?
Drug Test Problem
Suppose the following statistics about drug use are true:
A survey revealed that 15 of every 100 people employed by a particular company use drugs outside of work. Random urine tests were introduced which correctly indicate the presence of illegal drugs in 11 out of every 15 cases. However, there is a positive urine test in 31 out of every 85 innocent cases. However, chemicals in over-the-counter medications will trigger a positive urine test in 31 out of every 85 innocent cases.
What % of employees with a positive test has used illegal drugs?
Virus Scanner Problem
Suppose these statistics about an internet security package are true:
20 of every 100 files downloaded from the internet contain harmful viruses. 18 of every 20 infected files are detected by anti-virus scanners before they have a chance to do any damage.
However, virus scanners incorrectly identify 8 out of every 80 harmless files as infected. As some programming code found in viruses is also found in harmless files, virus scanners incorrectly identify 8 out of every 80 harmless files as infected.
What % of files identified as harmful turn out to contain a virus? What % of patients with positive results has Swine Flu?
HIV test problem
Water Contamination Problem
Suppose recent tests at a bottled water plant found:
12 in every 100 bottles produced are contaminated with harmful bacteria. A litmus test identifies 10 in every 12 of contaminated bottles. However, 18 in every 88 uncontaminated bottles are identified as being contaminated. However, the litmus test is also sensitive to some harmless bacteria and incorrectly identifies 18 in every 88 uncontaminated bottles as being contaminated.
What % of bottles identified as contaminated are actually contaminated?
Cab Problem
Suppose two taxi cab firms operate in a city; the Blue company and the Green company.
25 in every 100 cabs in the city are Blue and 75 in every 100 are Green. A witness to an evening car accident identified a Blue taxi as being involved. The court tested the witness' ability to identify taxis under similar visibility conditions and found that they correctly identified 18 out of 25 Blue cabs. However, the witness identified 22 out of 75 Green cabs as
Blue. However, due to faded paint, some blue and green taxis looked similar, and the witness misidentified 22 out of 75 green cabs as blue.
Given this information, what is the % chance the witness was correct and the taxi involved in the accident really was Blue?
Intrusion Detection System Problem
Suppose the following crime statistics are true:
30 out of every 100 museums in the UK are broken into each year. The Laser detection systems which all museums have nowadays will sound an alarm in 20 out of every 30 robbery attempts. However, every year alarms sound when there is no intruder in 6 museums out of every 70. However, rodents can trip the alarm and every year alarms sound when there is no intruder in 6 museums out of every 70.
Given a raised alarm; what is the % chance there has been a robbery attempt?
Fighter Jet Problem
Suppose that in preparation for the threat of attack from Vietnamese and Cambodian planes during the Vietnam War; the US Army trained lookout soldiers.
In every 100 training trials, 28 out of every 30 Vietnamese planes were correctly identified. 
